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Organisations, character, virtue and the role of professional practices 
Geoff Moore 
Durham University Business School, UK 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will argue that any approach to character and virtue in professional organisations and 
practices that does not have an adequate conceptual framework for the inter-related individual-
organisational-societal levels will fail to be much more than a plea for individuals to be virtuous at 
work, or for organisations to be in some sense ‘good’. The essay will then provide such a conceptual 
framework based on the work of the moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre. It will apply this 
framework by critically considering the role of professional practices both as organisations / 
institutions in their own right and in relation to other organisations, where professional 
organisations and practices potentially have the ability to play a positive moderating role. 
 
The need for a conceptual framework for virtue in and of organisations 
Virtue is an individual-level concept. That is to say that, at least from Aristotle onwards, the concern 
of what we would now call virtue ethics has been with the formation of individual character; with 
such virtues as practical wisdom, justice, courage and temperance which contribute to the make-up 
of such a character; and with the avoidance of compromising vices. In its neo-Aristotelian form at 
least, it has thereby been concerned with the formation and moderation of desires; with whether 
these desires lead to goods and the good for the individual; and hence with more general human 
flourishing (MacIntyre, 2016). Virtue ethics is therefore correctly taken to be a teleological 
understanding of human life. 
But, of course, to say this is also to say that virtue ethics is a social and, indeed, even an 
environmental ethic. It has to do with how we as individuals relate to others, to social situations, to 
animals and to the natural environment. It is about all of these relationships, if for no other reason 
than that individual human good cannot be realised except in and through these relationships and in 
the pursuit and realization of the common good: 
“Each of us generally relies on others in pursuing our own individual goods. And this is even 
more obviously the case when the goods in question are not individual, but common goods, 
the goods of family, of political society, of workplace, of sports teams, orchestras, and 
theatre companies. Such goods we can achieve and enjoy only qua family member, qua 
citizen, qua participant in the relevant types of activity.” (MacIntyre, 2016: 51) 
In practice, of course, such social and organisational relationships also impose constraints on both 
individual agency and action, so that not only is it not always easy to know what one ought to desire 
if one is to pursue the good in one’s life, but it is also quite possible for such desires to be frustrated. 
Indeed, if we follow institutional theory’s understanding of our social lives as lived inside 
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institutional orders (the market; corporations; professions; family; community; religion and the 
state, Besharov & Smith, 2014), with such orders imposing their own logics on us (Thornton & 
Ocasio, 2008), we might think that individual agency and actions are constrained to an inordinate 
degree. However, institutional theory also recognises that such institutional arrangements leave 
‘space’ for individual and collective agency through the contradictions that are inherent in the 
various logics to which individuals and organisations are subject. That being the case, we might best 
understand an individual as, “the partially autonomous social actor in a contradictory social world 
and the active exploiter of social contradictions” (Seo & Creed, 2002: 230).  
We will return to institutional theory when we consider the role of professional organisations and 
practices, but for now the key point from the preceding discussion is the effect of an institutional 
understanding of the social world on individuals and organisations, and therefore on the exercise of 
virtue in and, as I shall argue, of organisations. This is to say that any consideration of virtues in 
business, or in organisations more generally, will need to take account of these wider constraints 
which are by no means always conducive to virtue. This is also to suggest that we require a 
conceptual framework for understanding this, one that provides a coherent schema from the 
individual through to the organisational and societal levels. Lacking this, we are liable to fall back on 
general and simplistic pleas for individuals to be virtuous at work, and for organisations to be in 
some sense ‘good’.     
Let us take, as an example, the Jubilee Centre Law report, Virtuous Character for the Practice of Law 
(Arthur, Kristjansen, Thomas, Holdsworth, Confalonieri & Qiu, 2014). The title is clear; it is about 
virtuous character, and so focuses on the individual or practitioner level. It gets as close as it ever 
does to the organisational level when it asks about institutional constraints on virtuous behaviour 
and it is interesting, if hardly surprising, that the constraints most frequently cited in interviews 
undertaken with legal practitioners related to “financial and business pressures, and the anxiety that 
these are impacting on ethics” (ibid.: 18). The report concludes that, “These findings indicate some 
constraints and anxieties about the maintenance of a virtuous character in the practice of law” (ibid.: 
23). The recommendations accordingly observe that: 
“A market society can lead to the commodification of legal services and be destructive of 
legal ethics. Worse than removing the personal and relational dimension to lawyer-client 
relations, however, is allowing price, competition and deal-making to be the principal tests 
of success. This can alter the character of a profession … The evidence of this study suggests 
there is no immediate risk of this occurring in the legal services sector. There is a need to 
ensure, however, that all its members and organisations have a firm commitment to, and a 
clear understanding of, virtuous practice and that education and training and organisational 
and professional cultures act together to sustain ‘good law’.” (ibid.:  24, emphases added) 
In other words, the organisational conditions that give rise to anxieties and concerns are recognised, 
but then played down: these are not a problem apparently, at least for now.  However, if these 
conditions were to become a problem, the answer would seem to be not just at the level of 
individual virtue, but also about the character of the professional practice, and about professional 
organisations and cultures. But apart from recognising this, the report is silent on what these 
organisational and supra-organisational responses might be, and how these might affect 
professional practices at the organisational and cultural levels. There is, in other words, no deeper 
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recognition of a dimension of virtue extending beyond the individual, or of the need for a conceptual 
framework that might contain this. It is this that I am here concerned to explore, since – as 
acknowledged in the Law report – the organisational and societal levels of professional virtue are at 
least significant and possibly decisive for the development of individual virtue. 
To counter this rather individualistic approach to professional virtue, I propose to offer a perspective 
that does allow us to relate the individual, organisational, and societal levels of professional conduct 
and which draws upon the work of Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue – though now considerably 
developed from his original writing on these issues. This will, among other things, enable us to 
appreciate what it might mean for an organisation to be virtuous, and hence what might be meant 
by ‘organisational character’. In terms of this perspective, we will also be able to consider the role of 
professional practices as both organisations / institutions in their own right, and as they relate to 
other organisations. 
 
MacIntyre’s conceptual framework   
Before considering the framework which MacIntyre offers, one might ask: “Why MacIntyre?” This is 
pertinent given that MacIntyre is well known for his critical comments on ‘modernity’ in general, 
capitalism in particular (at least in its Anglo-American form: see, for example, MacIntyre, 2015; for a 
critique Dobson, 2009) and the role of professional managers within the institutions of “liberal 
individualist modernity” as he terms it (MacIntyre, 2007: 195). 
The answer is in part that the framework provided by MacIntyre gives us the conceptual clarity and 
terminology that we require to link the individual, organisational and societal levels of professional 
virtue and practice in a coherent way. A stronger claim is that this is the only such framework for this 
purpose: that no other writer on the virtues provides us with the resources that we require for this 
task. Another part of the answer is that this framework has been ‘tested’, not in the positivist sense 
of formulating hypotheses and empirically testing them, but in that it has been applied in both 
theory and practice to a wide range of organisations and occupations. For example, we have studies 
of the circus (Beadle, 2013), the health service (Beadle & Moore, 2011; Kempster, Jackson & Conroy, 
2011), retailing (Moore, 2012), manufacturing (Breen, 2012; Fernando & Moore, 2015), surgery 
(Hall, 2011), churches (Moore & Grandy, 2017), banking (Robson, 2015; van de Ven, 2011), nursing 
(Sellman, 2000), accounting (West, 2016) and human resource management (Wilcox, 2012).i This 
gives some measure of confidence that MacIntyre’s framework ‘works’ in practice. 
What, then, is the framework which MacIntyre offers? This is shown in diagrammatic form in Figure 
1. In outline, virtues mainly find their place in what MacIntyre terms ‘practices’, and the exercise of 
virtues leads to the achievement of what he terms the ‘internal goods’ of such practices. Practices 
are: 
“any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through 
which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form 
of activity ...” (MacIntyre, 2007: 187) 
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However, if they are to endure for any length of time, practices also need to be sustained by 
institutions. Institutions are the “social bearers” (MacIntyre, 2007: 195) of practices but, in contrast 
to practices and their focus on internal goods: 
"Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with ... external goods. They 
are involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they are structured in terms of 
power and status, and they distribute money, power and status as rewards.” (MacIntyre, 
2007: 194) 
On this understanding, organisations can be characterised as ‘practice-institution combinations’. But 
this characterisation immediately points to an inherent tension in MacIntyre’s sociology of 
organisations, a tension between practices and institutions, and between the generation and 
prioritisation of internal versus external goods, which is fundamental to virtuous organisational life.  
Before exploring this analysis in more depth, it is at this point worth referring back to the earlier 
discussion of institutional theory to note that MacIntyre’s use of the term ‘institution’ differs in 
some respects from its usage there.ii Institutions in institutional theory are supra-organisational 
mechanisms, providing what are sometime referred to as the ‘rules of the game’, whereas MacIntyre 
uses the term mainly in an organisational sense: “Chess, physics and medicine are practices; chess 
clubs, laboratories, universities and hospitals are institutions” (MacIntyre, 2007: 194). Despite this, it 
is worth noting that both practices and institutions are not, on MacIntyre’s understanding, confined 
to any particular form of organisation. Medicine, to take one of MacIntyre’s examples, is practised 
by local surgeries, pharmacies, hospitals, university departments, commercial pharmaceutical 
companies, and charitable research organisations, and is supported by commercial manufacturers of 
surgical and more general medical equipment. To be involved in medical practice within one of these 
organisations is therefore to be linked to a much broader understanding of the practice of medicine. 
And similarly, the institutions that ‘house’ such practice are also linked together – including in some 
cases, as we shall discuss later, the professional bodies which form part of the practice’s institutional 
environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  An organisation as a practice-institution combination (see Moore & Beadle, 2006) 
PRACTICE 
Concerned with 
the exercise of 
virtue and the 
achievement of 
internal goods 
INSTITUTION 
Concerned with the achievement of 
external goods 
P  
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To return to MacIntyre’s framework, internal goods concern the excellence of the products that the 
organisation produces or of the services it provides, together with the ‘perfection’ of the individual 
practitioners of the practice (MacIntyre, 1994; 2007). With regard to medicine, for example, the 
internal goods would concern the health and well-being of patients, together with the ‘perfection’ of 
practitioners such as doctors and nurses. MacIntyre does indeed say that “the craftsperson is 
perfected through and in her or his activity” (1994: 284), thus using ‘perfected’ without qualification. 
But we might more naturally think of this in terms of the development of the moral qualities and 
skills and the flourishing of medical practitioners. In contrast to internal goods, which we might 
characterise as being to do with the pursuit of excellence, external goods might include survival, 
reputation, power, profit or, more generally material success. It is these that, as we have seen, are 
often the priorities of the institution. 
MacIntyre’s definition of practices extends to a wide range of activities. We have already seen that 
he considers chess, physics and medicine to be practices, and he argues more generally that “arts, 
sciences, games, politics in the Aristotelian sense, the making and sustaining of family life, all fall 
under the concept” (2007: 188).  In this light, it has been argued (Moore, 2002, 2005, 2012; Moore & 
Beadle, 2006), largely in contradiction of MacIntyre’s own position on capitalism and the 
prioritisation of external over internal goods which it embodies (1994; 2007), that it is legitimate to 
apply what MacIntyre says of “productive crafts” (1994: 284) to organisations in general and to 
business organisations in particular (as have some of the studies mentioned above). The general 
requirement is only that at the core of any organisation there is a genuine practice such as chess, 
physics and medicine, or – as with some of the examples given above – retailing or manufacturing. In 
such cases, the specific requirement is that the particular internal goods of the practice contribute to 
the common good of the community.  
This, however, does not mean that all organisations necessarily house practices. Indeed, it has been 
argued (Moore, 2017), on the basis of two studies of banking referred to above (Robson, 2015; van 
de Ven, 2011), that while ‘traditional’ banking might well have been a practice, ‘new’ banking is not. 
As MacIntyre himself says, “the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the 
acquisitiveness of the institution … the cooperative care for common goods of the practice is always 
vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution” (2007: 194). Thus, the unbridled pursuit of 
external goods may override the pursuit of internal goods and destroy the practice – though it is 
worth noting that unless the institution does at least sustain the core practice that it houses, the 
organisation itself may not survive. On this understanding, it is at least possible that new banking 
may still contain the traces of the original practice, although it might require significant reformation 
to return to being a practice with genuine internal goods directed to the good of clients and the 
common good. 
Before moving on, there is one other part of the conceptual framework shown in Figure 1 that has 
not yet been commented on. This is the smaller circle containing a “P” in the top left hand corner. 
This reflects MacIntyre’s observation:  
“Yet if institutions do have corrupting power, the making and sustaining of forms of human 
community – and therefore of institutions – itself has all the characteristics of a practice, and 
moreover of a practice which stands in a peculiarly close relationship to the exercise of the 
virtues …” (2007: 194-5, emphasis added)  
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This, therefore, is a way of both locating and describing management within MacIntyre’s framework. 
It implies that there is another, albeit secondary, practice of institution-making in organisations, and  
that those who engage in this – managers in general – have the opportunity to exercise the virtues 
of this practice and thereby achieve the internal goods available from it (Moore, 2008). Further, on 
this understanding, management has been characterised as a “domain-relative practice” (Beabout, 
2012) containing both generic aspects pertaining to governance of the institution, and specific 
aspects related to the particular core practice at the heart of the organisation. Such management 
demands “experiential knowledge of particulars” (ibid.: 424) and in this sense, management is never 
an abstract activity but always the management of something. 
In light of this, we are in a position to consider the features of a virtuous organisation, features that 
responsible senior managers might be expected to nurture and promote. Firstly, a virtuous 
organisation should have a good purpose – which, as we have seen, may be characterised by 
reference to the internal goods of the practice (the excellence of the product or service and/or the 
‘perfection’ of practitioners) that contribute to the common good of the community. Secondly, the 
organisation needs to appreciate that, “it is founded on and has as its most important function the 
sustenance of the particular practice that it houses” (Moore & Beadle, 2006: 366), and that this 
involves striving for excellence in this core practice. Finally, however, the institution would also 
pursue external goods insofar as these are required to sustain and develop the core practice, but not 
as ends in themselves. 
This final feature perhaps requires further explanation concerning the relationship between internal 
and external goods. We have already seen that the simultaneous pursuit of both of these types of 
goods constitutes an inherent tension in organisations. Indeed, it is the unbridled pursuit of external 
goods in the societies of modernity that has consistently exercised MacIntyre: “it is ... always 
possible for a particular individual or social group systematically to subordinate goods of the one 
kind to goods of the other” (1988: 35, emphasis added). Nonetheless, external goods are, of course, 
still goods, and it has been argued that there is an “essential but complex circularity between internal 
and external goods” (Moore, 2012: 380, emphasis in original), such that the internal goods of a 
practice lead to the production of external goods that are in turn needed to support and develop 
practices.  
To this extent, the ordering of internal and external goods may be complex in at least some 
practices.  For whilst internal goods should be given priority – since it is these which give purpose to 
human activities – insofar as this requires the pursuit of external goods, there may need to be an 
appropriate balancing of the pursuit of both. This, of course, requires organisational practitioners in 
the core practice and at managerial levels to judge and act when the pursuit of these different sorts 
of goods has become disordered or unbalanced.  
By characterising organisations in this way, however, an important conceptual point has been made. 
This is that it is possible to talk, even if only by way of metaphor (Moore, 2017), of organisational-
level virtue (and vice), and therefore of organisational (and potentially professional) character. 
Drawing on the shorthand of ‘excellence’ and ‘success’ to capture the aims of practices / internal 
goods on the one hand and institutions / external goods on the other, organisational character has 
been defined as:  
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“the summary of characteristics that develop over time in response to an organisation’s 
challenges, opportunities and its own pursuit of virtue. An organisation can be characterised 
by the extent to which it possesses and exercises moral virtues (and lacks the associated 
vices) and by the extent to which it draws on the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom in its 
pursuit of a good purpose, and to enable the correct ordering and balance in its pursuit of 
excellence and success.” (Moore, 2015: 109-10)iii 
This, then, completes the description of MacIntyre’s conceptual framework, at least to the extent 
required for present purposes. However, it is worth emphasising that this provides a coherent 
schema from the individual through to the organisational and societal levels. It is a framework that 
links individuals as practitioners to their cooperative work with others inside practices; practice-
institution combinations form the organisational level; and the contribution to the common good 
provides the link to the societal level. With this, we have what we need conceptually to critically 
examine the role of professional organisations and practices.  
 
Understanding professional organisations and practices 
Before applying MacIntyre’s framework, however, it is necessary to paint a partially historical and 
largely sociological account of professions and those occupations that have aspired to ‘professional’ 
status. If, as Scott (2008) claims, it is the set of professionals, broadly characterised, who supply the 
choreography to which the rest of us, as individuals and organisations, dance, then such 
professionals occupy a distinctive and hegemonic role in society. However, historically, a 
functionalist understanding of professions (Scott, 2008; Muzio, Brock & Suddaby, 2013), according to 
which they occupied a privileged position, inculcating deference (Carter, Spence & Muzio, 2015; 
Saks, 2016) but in exchange for a public-service orientation, would seem only to have lasted from 
the 1930s to the 1960s (Scott, 2008).  
This conception was followed by a conflictual understanding, which argued that the functionalist 
account amounted to nothing more than “apologies for entrenched monopoly power” (Scott, 2008: 
220). The focus thus shifted “from clients’ to providers’ interests and from technical or knowledge-
based claims to political explanations” (ibid.: 220). Professions on this account encouraged 
“exclusionary social closure” (Saks, 2016: 179) on behalf of certain professional groups. 
Latterly, however, an institutional model of profession and professional practice has come to the 
fore (Scott, 2008, see also Muzio et al., 2013; Saks, 2016), which, while not dismissing the conflictual 
elements in earlier analyses, seeks to offer a more “social constructionist conception of the role of 
professions” (Scott, 2008: 221). This has been characterised as: 
“a view that permits us to argue that the knowledge claims advanced by professionals can 
be both somewhat arbitrary and sincerely advanced, that professional jurisdictions can be 
contested and changing without being a simple matter of political clout, and that in many 
circumstances the advancement of professional interests is not inconsistent with attention 
to client welfare.” (Scott, 2008: 221) 
Characteristically, and certainly within the functionalist conception, professions have been 
understood as embodying several distinct, albeit inter-related, elements: altruism or related public 
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interest responsibilities; autonomy and self-regulation; authority over clients based on a systematic 
and specialist body of knowledge into which professional practitioners are inducted; a distinctive 
occupational culture often including a professional code of ethics; and recognition not only by the 
community but also the state (Lail, MacGregor, Marcum & Stuebs, 2017; Wilson, Hewitt & Thomas, 
2010). In addition to this, via the educational qualifications for entry (Wilson et al., 2010), 
professions have been understood as controlling access and thereby limiting the supply of labour 
(Saks, 2016). 
That said, not all occupations have been able to attain the same status, and so a spectrum emerges 
from classic or “‘strong’ professionals (medical doctors, lawyers, and the like) to ‘weaker’ semi- and 
welfare state professionals like social workers” (Noordegraaf, 2011: 1352). “Managerial 
professionals” (managers, controllers or consultants) as they tend to be termed (ibid.: 1352) are, at 
best, classified towards the weaker end of this spectrum, with management clearly not considered a 
‘profession’ in the classical sense, given that it has no fully accepted body of knowledge (Wilson et 
al., 2010), limited ability to control entry standards, and similarly limited state recognition. Indeed, 
Wilson et al. (2010: 330) contend that by the late 20th century, accountants, rather than managers, 
were recognised as the “priesthood of industry” (citing Matthews, Anderson & Edwards, 1998), so 
that senior managers merely mimicked the language of accountants in an attempt to bolster their 
own position, while simultaneously joining forces with accountants “in a partnership aimed at 
reinforcing the power of capital over all other factors of production” (Wilson et al., 2010: 331). 
Nor is this, which one might refer to as the ‘marketization’ of the professions, unique to accountancy 
and the not-quite-and-never-will-be ‘profession’ of management. Associated with the institutional 
model of professions has been the move of many professional practitioners to work in organisations 
other than those established by their professions. The most obvious of these are those professional 
service organisations that employ lawyers, accountants, marketers and architects. There has 
therefore been “a shift of professional work to organisational settings and with the rise of the 
professional service firm as a key locus and vector of professionalization” (Muzio et al., 2013: 701). 
Indeed, it has been argued that new forms of professionalism (“management consultants, project 
managers, HRM specialists or executive search practitioners”, ibid.: 703), have emerged from such 
organisational settings. 
Such new organisational arrangements have arisen partly in response to “a new type of client: the 
collective or corporate actor” (Scott, 2008: 231). These new organisational and institutional 
arrangements have affected not just more commercially-oriented occupations but also the more 
traditional professions of medicine and law, providing impetus for them “to become organised into 
group practices, or medical organisations, or law firms” (ibid.: 231). While this has been seen by 
some as an attack on professionalism itself (Noordegraaf, 2011), a more general response has been 
that professional service firms “are increasingly adopting both the logic and structures of business 
corporations. Professional identities are increasingly framed around logics of efficiency and 
commerce which have displaced traditional logics of ethics and public service” (Muzio et al., 2013: 
700-1, incorporated references removed).  
A further response has been, rather predictably, contestation within professions, with professional 
service firms responding “to different logics and understandings of professionalism from the 
professional associations that represent and regulate them” (Muzio et al., 2013: 711). Furthermore, 
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diverse professional organisations and practitioners have been implicated in cases of misconduct 
and malpractice: “the raft of scandals and corporate collapses in recent years were only possible 
thanks to the acquiescence, if not complicity, of a number or professions including accountants [and] 
lawyers” (Carter et al., 2015: 1208). This has given rise to concerns that “the very notion of 
professionalism [may be] redundant”, constituting “nothing more than an ideological land-grab 
advanced by interest groups whose concern for society has only ever been tenuous at best” (ibid.: 
1209). 
 
A critical but positive approach to professional organisations and practices: employing MacIntyre’s 
framework 
While the above analysis may very well not apply in full to all professional organisations and 
practices, it might reasonably be argued to represent a general tendency that they all share, and 
which seems to reflect the tensions inherent in MacIntyre’s framework. Originally, perhaps, genuine 
concern for the internal goods of practices – the excellence of the products or services and the 
‘perfection’ of practitioners in the process – were pursued by most traditional professions because 
of the contribution to the common good this enabled; and society responded by according them 
privileged status both to encourage the pursuit of excellence in these practices and for the 
consequent contribution to the common good.  
But such practices could not survive without institutionalisation, and institutions are necessarily 
concerned with the acquisition of external goods. Thus, the tensions characteristic of practice-
institution combinations emerged and, in societies which came systematically to subordinate 
internal to external goods, exploitation of the privileged status which classical professions had 
gained became possible. Other occupations (management, for example) have sought professional 
status lured by the external goods thereby attainable. 
Law, as noted earlier, may not yet provide an example of this process, although even here concerns 
were expressed. The commercialization of accounting, however, is arguably a professional practice 
which does provide an example of this process, even to the extent that it has been suggested it is in 
servitude to capital (West, 2016). Working within a MacIntyrean frame, West (2016: 12) continues: 
“it is noticeable that outside the realm of academia, there is, in fact, little debate on the 
goods and purpose of accounting . . . [and this is] to point out that without such debate 
within the actual practices and institutions of accounting, the tradition of accounting is, 
according to MacIntyre’s scheme, in a state of decay.” 
But this also points to the way in which MacIntyre’s framework might be used towards the 
formulation of a more positive future. The concern here has been aired already: that unless the 
institution sustains pursuit of the internal goods of the practice at its core it is liable to decay from 
within. The general concern is therefore that of how professional practices may resist the corrupting 
power of the organisations or institutions in which they are embedded. Three further studies, also 
working within a MacIntyrean framework, offer suggestions in this regard.  
In relation to both surgery (Hall, 2011) and nursing (Sellman, 2000), considerable emphasis is placed 
on the commitments characteristic of such practices. Such commitments are ultimately to the 
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flourishing of patients, to the professional standards of service to others, to fellow practitioners, and 
to the organisations / institutions that sustain them. It is clear from these studies that, when (and 
only when) surgery and nursing are in good order, such commitments to the internal goods of the 
practice will take priority over any pursuit of external goods.  
A study of human resource practitioners in a commercial environment (Wilcox, 2012) confirms this 
understanding by demonstrating the need for managers to resist organisational pressures related, in 
this case, to unwarranted reductions in staffing numbers introduced by a new CEO. But, significantly, 
the professional membership and commitment of such personnel and recognition of associated 
moral responsibilities for the “just treatment of employees” (ibid.: 88), seems to have been a factor 
in resisting such trends. 
What such studies in the light of MacIntyrean analysis indicate is a need – but also the potential – for 
professional practices, where they are disordered, to return to the internal goods at their core; 
indeed, to become (again) practices in the MacIntyrean sense. Like other organisations, those that 
sustain professional practices need to prioritise the pursuit of internal over external goods – while 
ensuring some balance between the occupational need for both – if they are to be virtuous. To 
achieve this, they will need an organisational / professional character as outlined above, and hence 
will require organisational virtues and the avoidance of organisational vices similarly outlined. Given 
this, these professional organisations and practices would have the potential, in relation to those 
professional service and other organisations where professionals work, to play a positive moderating 
role. This would enable a similar pursuit of internal over external goods within these organisations, 
offering resources to practitioners to enable them to prioritise their practices and to resist the 
corrupting power of their own institutions, and with a paramount concern for the common good. 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that in order to make sense of virtuous professional organisations and practices we 
need a conceptual framework that integrates the individual, organisational / institutional and 
societal levels of occupational function, and that MacIntyre’s work offers us just such a framework. 
In light of the analysis above, we may conclude that MacIntyre’s framework offers a philosophically 
justifiable but also practically useful means by which contemporary professional occupations might 
once again find their true purpose in pursuit of the internal goods of their practices, and so resist the 
corrupting pressures of modern commercialization. 
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i See Moore (2017), Chapters 8 and 9, for a discussion of these and other examples. 
ii For a discussion of the relationship between institutional theory and MacIntyre’s work, see Moore & Grandy 
(2017). 
iii In the original this referred to ‘corporations’. Another change, reinforcing the notion of balance between the 
pursuit of excellence and success, has also been made.   
